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DEVELOPING THE PRICING CONCEPT
Go to section... which explored several potential charging schemes for central and inner
London and looked at aspects of scheme operation using cordon charges. It concluded that congestion charging could be both feasible and worthwhile as a traffic management tool in London, but that there would be substantial technology, public acceptability and political risks surrounding the progression of any actual scheme in the medium term.
In 1998, the government published a white paper (statement of legislative intentions) setting out the proposed powers and responsibilities of a new mayor of London. This included powers to allow the implementation of road user charging schemes in London, and for the revenues to be retained by the charging authority to be expended on transport in London. This 'hypothecation' or retention of the revenues by the charging authority was an innovative aspect of the proposals, intended to make it more acceptable -both politically and publicly.
Meanwhile, the Government Office for London (a regional structure of national government) established a working group of technical experts to explore how a future mayor might use these proposed powers. The group became known as Rocol -road charging options for London. In 
ESSENTIALS OF SCHEME OPERATION
Go to section... The area covered by the original scheme represents less than 2% of the total area of greater London and, within the area during charging hours, less than 2% of vehicle-kilometres driven within greater London.
However, congestion in central London was severe during the working day, caused by high intensities of terminating and through traffic.
Comparable characteristics also applied to the western extension, although both traffic volumes and congestion were somewhat less intense than in the original central zone before the introduction of charging.
Of particular note from Figure 1 are the various boundary and 'free passage' route arrangements -no charge is made for vehicles using these routes. These are existing high-capacity roads that provide good alternatives for drivers making trips through central London who wish to avoid paying the charge. In particular, a 'free passage route' divides the two halves of the enlarged zone, allowing drivers to avoid paying the charge without diverting too widely around the outside of the enlarged zone. The basic area charge was initially set at £5 per day for all chargeable vehicles, applying between 0700 and 1830 h on working weekdays only (revised in 2007 to 1800 h). The basic charge does not vary with distance driven, or the time of day at which individual trips are made. 
MONITORING THE IMPACTS OF THE SCHEME
Go to section...
From the outset the mayor and TfL accorded a high priority to effective monitoring of the impacts of the scheme. In part, this reflected the high profile and controversial nature of the scheme at the time of its introduction. In promoting the scheme the mayor made it clear that, if it did not perform satisfactorily, it would be adjusted. Indeed this flexibility is a strength of any charging scheme: the hours of operation, the level of the charge; the definition of the charging zone; the details of exemptions; and the extent and nature of discounts can all be varied to reflect policy and operational considerations.
TfL's impacts monitoring programme also reflected a wish to capture and understand more fully the responses to -and the implications of -the UK's first major urban road user charging scheme. This meant more than simply recording the effects of the scheme, but seeking to understand how they arose, their implications for London more generally, and what would have happened in the absence of the scheme. Furthermore, although the monitoring work had a strong focus on the more immediate traffic volume and congestion impacts, it also included the important areas such as impacts on business, the economy, the environment, personal (social) circumstances and changed travel behaviour.
The result was a monitoring programme of a scale that had probably never before been attempted in relation to a single traffic management scheme. Findings from the monitoring work are set out in six annual monitoring reports -available from the TfL website. These build into a comprehensive appreciation of the main impacts and achievements of the scheme, the contents of each having a different emphasis, reflecting the evolution of the scheme. Table 1 gives more details. Table 1 .
Click to view Table 1 .
Content of TfL's Congestion Charging Impacts
Monitoring Reports
Five important considerations underpinned the design of the monitoring work; they are listed here.
 (a) The need to balance requirements for an early view of impacts with the longer-term imperative to understand the mechanisms at work. An important -and somewhat surprisingfinding was that the main traffic impacts to the scheme occurred and became established almost overnight. There was no prolonged period of 'adjustment', as had been envisaged before implementation.  (b) The need for more than one robust measure of key quantities. Different methods each have particular features and there is rarely 'one simple answer'. In measuring congestion, for example, three different methods gave significantly different estimates of the absolute quantities involved, but very similar estimates of changes and trends.  (c) The need to look outside the charging zone. Much of the benefits from the scheme, such as reduced traffic, road traffic accidents and emissions actually occur outside the charging zone, reflecting the combination of reduced traffic moving to or from the zone with diverted traffic moving around the zone.  (d) Providing for the unexpected. The high media profile of the scheme in its early years meant that TfL had to be in a position to respond at very short notice to specific assertions and claims in the media. This particularly affected the impacts of the scheme on business -where the 'lagged' nature of key business and economy indicators made responding to assertions by those with 'inside information' very difficult.  (e) Finally, a particular difficulty arises with the issue of what would have happened without the scheme. Central London is unique; it cannot be compared directly with anywhere else. Background conditions and influences are difficult to isolate but for many impacts these were ultimately perhaps the major factor in change; some effects are subtle and do not lend themselves to ready observation or measurement; and there was little understanding of the timescales of scheme impacts -how quickly or how slowly would the effects occur.
The results of the monitoring programme have added to knowledge of traffic and transport in London, but perhaps inevitably have also exposed issues that are still being examined and are not yet fully understood.
Nevertheless the scheme and its monitoring have contributed significantly to an understanding of the general feasibility, effectiveness and acceptability of urban road user charging schemes.
MEASURMENT OF IMPACTS
Go to section... 
Measuring traffic volumes

Measuring congestion
Measurement of the effect of the scheme on traffic congestion presented greater technical challenges -accentuated by the fact that the anticipated reductions in congestion of between 20 and 30% was the raison d'être for the scheme -and early feedback on whether this had been achieved was expected.
The first step was to increase substantially the frequency of the established moving car observer surveys in and around central London. 
Secondary transport impacts
In addition to the traffic volume and congestion impacts, the monitoring work covered a range of 'secondary' traffic and transport impacts. These included understanding the impact of the scheme on public transport in central London -through 'displaced' former car users. In this context the congestion charging scheme needs to be seen alongside other elements of the mayor's transport strategy, which placed great emphasis on the improvement of bus services -both as an essential adjunct to the scheme itself but also reflecting a wider policy priority. Existing TfL data sources provided much of the information required here.
Wider social, economic and environmental impacts
Beyond the immediate impacts of the scheme on traffic, congestion and travel in and around central London there were a variety of wider potential impacts and issues. These ranged across aspects of the impacts of the scheme on individuals and households, on business and economic activity and on aspects of the environment such as air quality.
Concerns over many of these had been raised by stakeholders as part of the scheme development process, and TfL needed to be sure that it was in a position both to understand these impacts and to address any issues that arose.
The main elements of the work included large-scale business and social impacts surveys, covering the behavioural, lifestyle, cost and adaptation aspects of the impact of the scheme on Londoners, with particular emphasis on 'potentially vulnerable' groups, such as 'key' and shift workers. The work also included assembly and secondary analysis of regional economic indicators, such as business turnover and retail sales trends, and analysis of trends in air quality in and around the charging zone, alongside scheme operational and enforcement details, which primarily arose from TfL's contractors for the scheme.
RESULTS OF MONITORING
Traffic entering and circulating within the zone
In the first year of operation, traffic entering the original charging zone Click to view Speeds moving between junctions did not materially increase.
Congestion inside the original zone
Visible from the figure is the trend towards returning congestion in more recent years. This has been a considerable source of concern -as for some time the causes were not immediately obvious. Traffic was not returning to the zone, which would have reflected a diminishing deterrent effect of the charge, but was in fact continuing to decline slowly, reflecting background trends.
Analysis in TfL's sixth annual impacts monitoring report showed that a primary cause of increased daytime congestion was an increase in the The impact of congestion charging therefore needs to be assessed in this context. Sustained reductions to the levels of traffic in the central zone mean that, when compared to conditions that would prevail without the scheme, congestion charging is continuing to deliver congestion relief that is broadly in line with the initial percentage reductions experienced in the early years following the introduction of the scheme.
Use of public transport for travel to, from and within central London
In the first year of the operation of the scheme, passengers entering the 
Other key impacts
The scheme contributed to safer roads. It is estimated that the lower volume of circulating vehicles in the original zone and its boundary route directly leads to between 40 and 70 fewer reported personal injury road traffic collisions per year. This is against a wider backdrop of substantial year-on-year falls in reported road casualties, at least in part due to wider Mayor's Transport Strategy initiatives. It is too early to judge whether a comparable effect has occurred in the western extension.
The central London economy has performed strongly since the introduction of charging. This was an area of particular concern with the original scheme. Contrary to the expectations of some commentators, the growth in the profitability of the retail sector in central London has been comparable to that seen more widely across London, and recent growth has been roughly twice the national rate. With the benefits of hindsight and the data from a wide variety of sources, there is no evidence that the £5 or £8 charges have affected the aggregate economy of central London.
Charging has contributed to reduced emissions of pollutants and greenhouse gases. Reduced traffic levels and improved driving conditions led to a relative improvement in ambient air quality against that which would have prevailed in the absence of congestion charging.
It was estimated that congestion charging had been directly responsible for reductions of 8% in oxides of nitrogen (NO x ), 7% in fine particulate matter (PM 10 ) and 16% for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). These figures related
to an annual average 24 h day for all emissions from road traffic only.
The scheme has produced net revenues to support the mayor's transport strategy. These have been of the order of £100 million per year and have been reinvested in furthering other elements of the strategy, predominantly on improvements to London's bus network.
DEVELOPMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL SCHEME
Increase to the daily charge from £5 to £8
The increase in the daily charge from £5 to £8 from 
Impacts of the western extension
The Table 2 , which is primarily based on a combination of traffic model assessments and observed data, represents TfL's 'best assessment' of the changes resulting from the western extension. Table 2 .
Click to view Table 2 .
Summary of traffic changes from the western extension
COST OF IMPOSED DELAYS
Go to section... This value broadly represents the value of the delay that each vehicle using the zone is imposing on other users. A driver unwilling to pay this level of charge would have gained less from using the zone than the delay costs that they would have imposed on others.
In terms of its congestion impacts
EFFECTS ON CONGESTION
Paradoxically perhaps, the more recent trend towards increasing congestion has helpfully demonstrated some underlying characteristics of how the network operates. Figure 6 shows -to the same scale -the average network speeds in the central zone and the total traffic entering and leaving each zone. This is in effect a combined presentation of the data that inform Figures 2 and 3 for the original central zone, together with the comparable data for the western extension. Click to view Figure 6 illustrates the interaction between 'supply' effects (the speed of traffic, as a function of the demand) and 'demand' effects (the change in demand, as a function of the speed of traffic).
Interpretation
 (a) Supply effects depend on the network. If the network capacity stays constant, then as demand reduces due to charging then speeds increase.  (b) Demand effects depend on the underlying demand to drive.
It is affected by congestion charging. If the underlying demand to travel stays constant, then as the network gets slower, fewer people will want to drive on it.
In Figure 6 , the initial effect of charging is to reduce demand. Road 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINAL SCHEME
More recent TfL monitoring reports have been able to give a longer-term evaluative perspective on the experience with charging in central
London, such that it is possible to offer several reflections that will be of wider relevance.
First, the London scheme, with its various developments, has confirmed that charging is practically feasible. It has also generally confirmed the methodologies and theoretical basis behind the concept of road user charging. Initial fears of gridlock outside the zone, mass public confusion and economic desolation have been proven to be unfounded. Taking a longer-term perspective, the advent of charging can be seen as simply another evolutionary step in urban transport planning.
Second in terms of the potential wider applicability of charging, central
London was in some respects a particularly suitable candidate.
Congestion levels were very high. It is very well served by public transport, and travellers displaced from car to public transport would not overwhelm the capacity of the public transport system. It had a manageable proportion of through traffic. The political decision process, under an elected mayor, was straightforward. Other cities will have different characteristics, notably in terms of public transport provision and political structures, and these will be critical in determining the application and the more detailed nature of any future local schemes. 
AIM
Singapore was the first city to introduce road congestion pricing in 1975. It works on the principle that motorists pay for the use of road space at times and at places when and where they cause congestion. It has been modified many times over the course of two decades, to cater for the changes in traffic patterns. This paper describes the congestion pricing scheme called the Area Licensing Scheme (ALS), the reasons for the many modifications, lessons learned, and its future.
HOW CONGESTION PRICING FITS IN
Singapore has an overall transportation strategy which consists of :
* Integrated landuse and transportation planning; * Provision of a good road network complemented by good traffic management; * Improvement to public transport; and * Traffic Demand management Congestion pricing falls under "demand management". 
Summary of changes of ALS for the period 1975-95
DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA LICENSING SYSTEM (in 1995)
The congestion pricing system is called the Area Licensing Scheme (ALS). An imaginary cordon has been placed around the most congested parts of the city, termed the Restricted Zone (RZ), an area of 720 ha. Each of the 33 entry points to the RZ has an overhead gantry sign with the word "Restricted Zone". To enter this area during the period of 7.30am to 7.00pm on weekdays and 7.30am to 2.00pm on Saturdays, vehicles other that public scheduled buses and emergency vehicles need to purchase and display an area licence. These paper licences which come in daily and monthly forms have to be displayed clearly on the vehicle windscreens, or on special holders on the motorcycle handle bars. There are two types of licences, the wholeday and the partday (off-peak) and for three categories, namely motorcycles, company cars and others. The licences are distinguishable from each other by shape and colour. Licences are available at post offices, convenience stores, petrol stations and at special licence sales booths set up along the approach roads to the RZ. They cannot be purchased at the entry points. Police personnel are stationed in sentry huts at the entry points. They observe whether the vehicles are displaying the correct area licences as they pass the entry points. Offending vehicles are not stopped, but their particulars are taken down and they will receive a summons sent to their addresses for entering the RZ without a valid licence. The penalty is $70. Escape routes are provided at the main entry points to ensure that vehicles are not forced unwittingly to enter the RZ. There is no policing within the RZ. Vehicles are free to move around and leave the RZ.
Wholeday licence can be used for entry during the whole of the restricted period between 7.30am and 7.00pm on weekdays and 7.30am and 2.00pm on Saturdays. Partday licence can only be used for entry between 9.30am and 4.30pm on weekdays and 9.30am onwards on Saturday.
WHAT HAS ALS ACHIEVED?
Since 1975, the city area has grown by about 30% in terms of area with increases in employment and commercial activity. The vehicle population has increased by 245% from 276,866 at beginning of 1974 to 677,818 in mid-1997 over the same period. Yet traffic conditions in the city roads are better than what it was in 1975. The current average traffic speeds in the city during the working day varies from 26 kph to 35 kph, as compared with about 15 kph to 20 kph prior to implementation of ALS.
In 1975, the public transport share of the work trips to the city was 46%. Today it is estimated at 67%. With the gradually increasing patronage, public transport operators have been able to improve their services.
There has been a fundamental shift in the attitude to the car. True, that the car is still a muchsought after commodity by many, but public transport has become a respectable and acceptable alternative.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM
The ALS has brought many benefits to the transportation system in Singapore. But there are many lessons that we have learned from its operation. I will now discuss the main lessons learned from hands-on experience in the operation of the ALS.
Need To Shape Public Opinion
While people expect to pay for the use of water and electricity, paying for the use of road space is anathema to them. Traditionally, roads have always been seen to be public places where everyone has the right of free usage. Therefore, much work had to be done in the beginning to explain the rationale for charging for road use (or congestion pricing). It had to be sold as a part of a package of measures to address the transport problems. The public had to be assured that congestion pricing was not there to fill government coffers, but that alternatives would be offered for those affected. These include the improvement to public transport and some provision of alternative acceptable unpriced roads. After having announced these, the public had also to be convinced by seeing that the alternatives would be provided.
Make The Scheme Simple And Convenient
The motorist had to find the scheme to be easy to understand and use. The use of paper licences that were readily available at many sales outlets made it convenient for the motorists. All that the motorists had to do was to affix the licence by a sticker to the windscreen or to a holder on the motorbike. There was nothing else for him to do.
The control points were clearly demarcated and sufficient advance warning signs put up. At all major points, escape routes were provided to ensure that motorists were not forced unwittingly to enter the RZ. Signs were also put up to warn motorists that they were leaving the RZ.
Enforcement To Be Simple, Fair And Effective
Any scheme is only as effective as how well it can be enforced. Police personnel did the enforcement merely by watching for offenders, not a difficult task by itself. Nevertheless, it was a boring and mundane job.
It was necessary to ensure that the licences were easily visible and recognisable. Different colours were used for different months. The required size of licences to be clearly seen, was determined from field trials. There were a total of 3 categories of vehicles for differential charging i.e. motorcycles, company cars and others. Therefore, each licence came in a different shape. They were further distinguished by shape for monthly and daily licences -all monthly licences were partly circular and daily licences partly rectangular. Licences that catered for the wholeday had full colours, while those that catered to off-peak hours had half white-half colour.
The police were placed in a vantage and comfortable position for them to look out for these licences in special well-positioned sentry huts .
It was also necessary to ensure that enforcement and appeals were not cumbersome. Therefore, offending vehicles were not stopped, but received a summons to pay a fine of $70 for entering the RZ without a valid area licence. There were ample avenues for the motorists to appeal and to show proof that they had valid licences, that were not spotted by the police officers. Lastly and most importantly, there were no exemptions from the scheme, except for emergency vehicles and public scheduled buses. The "no special privilege" made the scheme more palatable.
Need To Guard Against Fraud
Licences are not transferable between vehicles. The registration number of the vehicle is written on the licence during the purchase. This is necessary for ease of enforcement. Otherwise, offending motorists could challenge the notice of summons for the offence by producing any area licence.
There have been some cases of motorists being caught transferring licences between vehicles. No cases of forged area licences have been reported.
Care In Demarcating Boundaries Of The Restricted Zone
This has always been a contentious issue. The original boundary of the RZ was demarcated to include the most congested parts of the city including car parks, office and commercial buildings. Nevertheless, during the demarcation, it was not totally possible to exclude all peripheral residential areas. Some affected residents who worked within the RZ welcomed this move, but those who worked outside, resented it. This was especially so when the restrictions were extended to include the whole day in 1994. These affected residents had now to buy an area licence to return home.
Over the two decades, some of the peripheral residential areas became commercial areas, owing to changes in landuse zoning; and these areas had to be brought into the RZ, which was in line with the original concept of including congested areas in the RZ. This was also a point of contention to some of the new owners.
There were some schools in the RZ and parents who came to pick up their children in the evening were unhappy when the restrictions were introduced to include the evening in 1989.
Fortunately many of the schools have been resited as part of an on-going programme to move them out of the city centre.
Need For Adequate Area Licence Sales Outlets
The area licences are bought beforehand i.e. unlike a toll system, it is not possible to get the licence at the entry points. It is thus necessary to provide adequate sales outlets. Monthly licences were bought well in advance of the month. Therefore, they were made available at all post offices which are conveniently located throughout the country from the 15th day of the preceding month.
Although post offices also sell daily licences, they are not popular outlets because they only open in the late morning. The most popular point of sale is the daily licence sales booths located along the approach roads to the RZ, which account for 65% of such sales. There are 26 such booths in all. To make them more convenient, many of them have been converted to drive-in booths, whereby the motorist can buy the licence without getting out of his vehicle. At some of the popular booths, it has become necessary to lengthen the driveways to serve two vehicles simultaneously. As the ALS was extended to cover more hours, there was a need for more outlets. Petrol stations and convenience stores have been brought into the fold.
Need For Continuous Monitoring Of The Scheme
The ALS has been monitored regularly over the past twenty-two years. These involved information on traffic counts, sale of licences, violations and regular surveys on attitudes and behaviour of motorists. The constant monitoring of the ALS gave early indications on trends and on when to make changes.
HIGHLIGHTS OF MONITORING
I will now discuss some of the highlights that became evident as a result of the monitoring.
The Mirror Image
The ALS started in 1975 with restrictions only applicable to cars, company cars and taxis during the morning peak hours of 7.30am to 10.15am. There was an underlying assumption that if we kept out some of these predominant vehicles from the RZ in the morning, then the evening problem will take care of itself because less vehicles had entered the RZ. Containing the morning problem did not completely solve the evening problem, but alleviated it only to a small extent. This improvement was much less than that expected i.e. the mirror image did not appear. The reasons were:-* Some of the restricted vehicles came into the RZ before or after the restricted periods, but joined the evening peak hour traffic out of the RZ to return home.
* The morning restrictions kept out the cross-town traffic that went through the RZ to outside destinations. In the evening, the cross-town traffic returned through the RZ in the absence of restrictions. It was estimated that they constituted 22% of the traffic in the city in the evening.
Restrictions On Cars
The ALS started in 1975 with restrictions on cars and company cars. The original objective was to discourage the widespread use of the car for the journey to work. A few weeks later, taxis were included, with the same restrictions as for cars. This was because they were seen milling around the entry points to the RZ causing congestion. However, their special status was recognised when the licence fees for them were reduced in 1977. As a result of these selective restrictions, the other categories of vehicles started using the RZ in large numbers. Goods vehicles took advantage of the uncongested conditions in the RZ to use it as a cross-town route. 50% of goods vehicles using the RZ were just passing through and 54% of them ran empty. There were also indications that some started using goods vehicles as surrogate for the car.
Moreover, over the years, it was felt that the objective of a road pricing was more appropriately to charge all vehicles for the use of road space, at times and at places when and where they cause congestion; and there were no more valid reasons to target only at the cars and taxis.
Carpools
With the original scheme, carpools (1 driver + at least 3 passengers) were given free entry. This was to counter the criticism that the ALS favoured the rich. Carpools became popular and at the height of its popularity, 52% of car traffic entering the RZ during the restricted hours were by way of carpools. What was happening was not carpooling, but hitchhiking. Motorists wishing to gain free entry into the RZ went to a bus stop and picked up 3 bus commuters to make up the carpool. This was a widespread practice. It lessened the demand on the overstretched public buses and the bus companies did not complain. For a short while, there was also a small racket of street urchins offering to form the carpool for a small fee, but this soon died out, as motorists realised that there were bus commuters who were willing to form these carpools in return for a free ride to the RZ. Cars were being used in a more effective manner with the average occupancy increasing to 2.2 from 1.7 during the morning. In the evening, there were no incentives for the drivers to form these carpools and the average occupancy remained at 1.7.
As the trains(mass rapid transit LRT) started running in 1987 and the bus services became better, it was obvious that the carpool scheme had outlived its usefulness. It was also viewed as a method to get around the ALS.
The Restricted Hours
The ALS started with morning restrictions. Whilst, there were considerable improvements in traffic in RZ in the morning, the evening situation started getting worse as the city grew in size and the vehicle population increased. Towards the end of the 1980s, it became clear that some sort of evening restrictions was necessary. Two options were open; either to exercise inbound control to the RZ at the same control points as in the morning, or to bring in exit control by forming another imaginary cordon in the RZ to charge vehicles going out during the evening peak hours. The former course was taken because it was more convenient for the motorist. Firstly, he would not have to remember that there were two sets of overhead gantries operating at different times. Secondly, it was not possible to set up convenient roadside sales booths in the city for motorists to buy evening licences.
In 1989, the scheme was thus revised with the following changes:
* The scheme was extended to evening peak hours; of 4.30pm-7.00pm * The restrictions were also extended to include all other vehicles, except public scheduled buses and emergency vehicles;
* Free entry for carpools were withdrawn; and * Area licence fees were reduced and a new fee amounting to one-third of car fees was introduced for motorcycles
As expected, there were complaints from motorists. Car drivers felt that the evening ALS would only divert traffic congestion to other locations. Motorcyclists claimed that they should be exempted because they did not contribute to congestion. Drivers of goods vehicles said that they would avoid the RZ, unless absolutely necessary, in which case, the companies would pay for their area licence. Companies, in turn claimed that the cost of business would go up because of the new restrictions on goods vehicles. Some residents in the RZ felt that they were victimised because now they were subject to the restrictions even when returning home.
Much effort had gone into publicity before and after the changes to explain the rationale and the advantages of the revisions, and on the ramifications if we did not stick to the tried package of transportation measures. There was even a hearing by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Land Transport Policies to discuss the changes, where many members of the public aired their views. There were many advantages of these public hearings because it gave the opportunity for us to better explain the need for changes and take measures to address some of their concerns.
After the initial furore, motorists took the evening restrictions in their stride and resumed life as usual.
Traffic Surge Before And After The Restricted Hours
Right from the beginning, we were confronted with the tremendous traffic volume surges before and after the restricted hours. Motorists who did not wish to pay rushed to the RZ in fairly large numbers just before 7.30am or 4.30pm. These did not create much problems. The postrestricted hour surge at 10.15am and at 6.30pm were higher and did create problems.
Compounding the problem were the habit of vehicles queuing up at the approach roads waiting for the scheme to end.
Furthermore, the ALS had created anomalies in the traffic system. Although, the critical morning peak hour traffic volume to the RZ was about 32% lower than what it was before the scheme, the off-peak hour traffic volume to the RZ during certain hours could be as much as 17% higher than these peak hour traffic volumes. Some localised traffic problems were being experienced in the RZ during these off-peak hours.
The final changes to the ALS came about in 1994 as follows:
* the ALS was extended to the whole working day;
* the fullday and partday area licences were introduced; * the new partday licence was for entry into RZ during off-peak hours at a lower rate; and * the whole day licence could be used for both peak and off-peak hours
The public reaction was muted than before. Many viewed it as the inevitable finally coming. The reduced off-peak charge was generally welcomed. Shops in the RZ feared that they would lose business. Some shops even offered to refund the cost of the area licence fee to patrons spending a preset amount.
There were general improvements to traffic in the RZ throughout the working day. The peak hours reverted back to the normal times. The general increase in speeds also benefited buses, especially during the off-peak periods.
Public Transport Usage
Other than the improved traffic conditions within the RZ, the main benefit has been the increase in public transport ridership for work trips into it. In 1974, before the ALS was introduced, 46% of the work trips were made by public transport, in 1994, this figure had climbed up to 67%. Although public transport system had improved by leaps and bounds during the past two decades, there is no denying the fact that the ALS has also helped to push people to public transport.
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF AREA LICENSING SCHEME
Road pricing has become a norm in Singapore for the past two decades. When it was introduced, the pledge was that it was a part of a total package to solve the transportation problems in a city with a very limited land area, where the unlimited building of roads was not possible. It was never sold or meant as a revenue-oriented scheme, such as a toll road system, but as a scheme to discourage the widespread use of the car and to shape the attitude to it. Many may dispute this claim, but there is a reluctant acceptance of the scheme because of the benefits in traffic flow that it has brought about. Furthermore, the public have seen many other transport projects such as road projects, a new urban railway and improved bus services catering to different categories of users. This has added credibility to the initial assertion that ALS was part of a total package.
Those motorists who are prepared to pay, drive to the RZ enjoy good traffic conditions with speed of up to and above 30 kph during the restricted hours. Others have convenient alternatives at reasonable cost. Nobody would dispute that the accessibility to the RZ and the city area has improved. In other words, mobility has not been reduced.
There are critics who feel that congestion pricing leads to under utilisation of the roads and hence of economic resources. There is also the other valid observation that some car trips have diverted to other peripheral roads and caused congestion elsewhere. But such congestion is more localised in nature and is spread over a shorter period than what was experienced in the city before ALS was introduced.
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF ALS
The strengths of the ALS are:
* easily implemented * easily understood by motorists * relatively cheap to operate
The weaknesses are:
* very labour intensive * enforcement is boring and mundane * each change brings about more complexity i.e. inflexible 9. THE FUTURE OF AREA LICENSING SCHEME The ALS will undergo a change. In 1998, it is expected that it would be replaced by an electronic road pricing scheme. This is meant to automate the scheme. The RZ will be demarcated by overhead gantry signs which carry radio antennae and enforcement cameras. Vehicles wishing to enter the RZ need to fix a small gadget called the invehicle unit (IU). The payment will be by a stored value smart card, which needs to be slotted into the invehicle unit as the vehicle passes under the gantry. Radio waves from the gantry will instruct the IU to deduct an appropriate charge from the smart card. If the transaction is successful, there would be no action. If the vehicle has no IU, no smart card or insufficient balance in the smart card, the enforcement cameras will take a photograph of the rear licence plate of the vehicle for subsequent enforcement.
The ERP will address some of the shortcomings of the ALS. For example, it will be possible to vary the charges easily, which would help to feather down the traffic surges that occur just before and just after the restricted hours. It is easier to allocate different charges to different categories of vehicles. ERP can also charge different rates at different gantries to effect preferred diversions of traffic flow.
COST BENEFIT BASED ON THE FIRST SCHEME (1975-89)
The capital costs Fringe car parks $5. 
IMAGES OF ALS
Restricted Zone(RZ) in the city ALS gantry signs at 28 entry points to RZ
